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Abstract  
This article investigates the moderating role of board independence in the relationship between 
debt financing and performance of emerging market firms. We have used an empirical model in 
which the firm's accounting profitability is a dependent variable and the independent variables 
are debt financing, board independence, the interaction variable made of debt financing and 
board independence, as well as various control variables. Our analysis is based on a panel 
dataset of 300 listed firms in Vietnam between 2013 to 2017. Our study finds that debt 
financing has a significantly negative effect and that board independence reduces the adverse 
impact of debt financing on accounting profitability. Our results are consistent across different 
estimation models and methods. 
Keywords: Debt financing, board independence, firm performance, emerging markets, 
Vietnam. 
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1. Introduction 
In emerging economies, capital markets are less well developed and it is more difficult to raise 
money to finance business ventures. Laws and regulations regarding accounting requirements, 
information disclosure, securities trading are either absent, inefficient, or do not operate as 
intended in emerging economies (Young et al.,2008). These problems create chances for 
managers to manipulate the use of debt financing for their benefit at the cost of shareholders. 
Therefore, a study about which corporate governance instruments can enhance the effectiveness 
of debt financing would improve our understanding of corporate governance practice in 
emerging economies. 
Despite the huge number of studies about debt financing, there is no consensus about the effect 
of debt financing on firm performance. Contingency and situational factors are a major 
explanation for these inconsistencies (O'Brien, 2003; Jermias, 2008). The effectiveness of debt 
financing can be affected by these factors. Thus, it is important to understand which situational 
and contingency factors may moderate the debt financing -performance relation.  
Drawing on agency theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976), which conceptualizes the useful role 
of independent directors (IDs) in monitoring managers, one can argue that under a high 
presence of independent directors, managers would use debt financing more prudently and 
effectively. In other words, board independence may moderate the effectiveness of debt 
financing. Nevertheless, research examining the role of board independence in moderating the 
impact of debt financing on firm performance is scant.  
Our paper aims to address this gap. We consider the factor improving the effectiveness of debt 
financing decision in the context of an emerging market. In particular, we investigate the 
moderating effect of board independence on the impact of debt financing on accounting 
profitability of Vietnamese firms. We chose Vietnam as an empirical context for the study 
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because the country has typical characteristics of an emerging economy. During the last two 
decades, Vietnam's capital market has significantly developed. However, most domestic firms 
are still relying on bank credit as a major or even the sole source of external funding (Vo, 
2017). Similar to other emerging economies, Vietnam's legal system is immature and corporate 
governance has not been long practised (World Bank, 2018). There are too many situations that 
managers made ineffective decisions on debt financing and harm the firm owners' benefits. 
Therefore, an examination of the role of board independence in monitoring the effectiveness of 
debt financing in Vietnamese firms would provide useful implications for corporate governance 
practices in emerging economies. We used the longitudinal data of 300 public firms listed in 
stock markets in Vietnam for the period 2013-2017. Our paper provides implications to both 
theory and practice which are presented in the conclusion.    
 
2. Literature Review and Hypothesis Development 
2.1. Board independence and firm performance 
Board independence has been the main focus of research on corporate governance. In most 
studies, the terminology "board independence", "board composition" or "board structure" are 
used interchangeably to imply the ratio of independent directors/outside directors to total 
members of the board. The usefulness of IDs has been widely debated in the corporate 
governance literature.  
Theoretically, there are conflicting views about the role of board independence on firm 
performance. According to agency theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976), the use of IDs can 
address the agency problem by providing oversight of the strategic direction of the firm and 
scrutinising the performance of managers and thus helps to improve firm performance. 
  
4 
 
Resource dependence literature (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978) also suggests IDs can facilitate the 
company's strategic decision-making process because of their expertise and networking 
(Westphal et al., 1997), enable the firm to obtain critical information (Haunschild and 
Beckman, 1998), form alliances (Gulati and Westphal, 1999), consequently enhancing firm 
performance. In contrast, stewardship theory (Donaldson and Davis, 1991) which defines 
situations in which managers want to do a good job and to be a good steward of the company 
indicates that the controlling and monitoring role of IDs have a negligible impact on firm 
performance. 
The empirical research has also reported inconsistent findings. Many studies (e.g., Peng, 2004; 
García-Ramos and García-Olalla, 2014) reported the positive effect of board independence on 
firm performance, others (e.g., Cavaco et al., 2016; Darko et al.,2016) found the negative 
impact as well as no significant effect (e.g., Rashid, et al.,2010). We argue that the inconsistent 
findings among the previous empirical studies occur because those studies only focused on the 
direct effect and did not consider the moderating effect of board independence on firm 
performance through other corporate governance instruments such as debt financing. 
2.2. Debt financing and firm performance 
The question of whether debt financing
1
 affects firm performance continues as one of the most 
important concerns in corporate governance literature. Despite the huge amount of theoretical 
and empirical research on the relationship between debt financing and firm performance, no 
agreement has been reached on this nexus (Vo and Ellis, 2017). 
Modigliani and Miller (1963) conceptualise the benefit of tax shield to firm profitability 
because interest payments are deductible from a corporate tax and resulting in less tax and more 
                                                 
1
 In corporate governance literature, the terminology 'debt financing', 'capital structure', 'financial leverage' are used 
interchangeably to indicate the extent to which a business relies on borrowed capital or the 'debt-equity ratio'. 
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profit after tax. In contrast, Kraus and Litzenberger (1973), Kim (1978) argue on the financial 
distress cost as the detrimental effect of debt financing on firm profitability. Costs associated 
with obtaining new external funding are higher than the costs of obtaining internal financing. 
Internal funds do not bear any transaction costs. Debts oblique firms to make periodic interest 
payment which not only reduces firm' profit in the accounting period but also limits available 
cash for the business's operations in the next accounting period (Sarkar and Sarkar, 2008). It can 
also make it more difficult to obtain additional debts where companies are highly leverage due 
to risk assessment (Le and O'Brien, 2010). As a result, the shortage of available cash could lead 
to the omission of profitable investment opportunities, which generates incremental income for 
the corporations. More severely, high debt cost may cause insolvency and bankruptcy. 
Empirically, some studies report the positive effect while others find a negative effect. Notably, 
many studies reporting the positive effect are the ones using the data from developed countries, 
while research using data of emerging economy firms tend to find the negative effect. For 
example, Berger and Patti (2006) using the data of American firms and Margaritis & Psillaki's 
(2010) use of data of French firms, both find the positive effect of debt financing on firm 
performance. Salim & Yadav (2012) using data of Malaysian listed firms, Le & O'Brien (2010) 
based on data of Chinese listed firms, Ebaid (2009) using data from Egypt and Zeitun; Tian 
(2007) using data from Jordan, all report the negative effect. An exception is Davydov (2016). 
Using data of firms from the BRIC countries, Davydov (2016) found the positive impact of debt 
financing. In this study, he did not consider any situational and contingency factors that could 
influence the effectiveness of debt usage.   
O'Brien (2003) and Jermias (2008) explain that inconsistent findings in the existing literature 
exist because of the lack of consideration of situational and contingency factors. Such 
situational and contingency factors potentially moderate the financial leverage- performance 
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relation. In this paper, we draw on two theories to identify such situational and contingency 
factors. We apply agency theory to identify contingency factors and we argue that the presence 
of good corporate governance, such as board independence, can improve the effectiveness of 
the debt-financing decision and that this potentially moderates the debt financing - performance 
relation. For situational factors, we employ the institutional-based view of emerging markets to 
analyse the potential effect of debt financing on the profitability of firms in emerging markets.  
According to the institutional-based view of emerging markets, emerging economies are ‘low-
income, rapid-growth countries using economic liberalisation as their primary engine of growth' 
(Hoskisson et al., 2000: 249). The literature on taxes and investment (e.g Hall and Jorgenson, 
1967) has argued various ways in which the tax structure can affect investments and therefore 
economic growth rates. As seen in Lee and Gordon (2005), increases in corporate tax rates lead 
to lower future growth rates within countries. Emerging-market governments, thus, tend not to 
use high corporate tax rates when they wish to promote economic growth. Therefore, the 
positive effect of tax cost reduction from debt payment on firm profitability is arguably 
insignificant in the context of emerging markets.   
Meanwhile, the financial distress cost of debt is likely to be high in the context of emerging 
markets for the following reasons. First, the lack of well-developed credit rating systems and 
well-regulated banking governance systems in emerging markets leads to high transaction and 
debt costs (Stiglitz, 2000). Second, loan interest rates in emerging markets are often set at a 
high level in comparison to those in developed markets. This is because emerging market 
economies have been fuelled by demand from foreign markets as a result of trade liberalisation, 
leading to a high need for capital to expand businesses which pushes up interest rates and so 
high cost of debt. Thus, in this institutional context, the cost of financial distress may well 
outweigh the benefit of debts and hence lower firm profitability. We, therefore, propose that:  
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 Hypothesis 1. High debt financing negatively affects the profitability of public listed 
firms in emerging economies. 
 
2.3. Debt financing, board independence and firm performance  
There is a large amount of literature examining the implications of board independence and debt 
financing, but little research focuses on the effects of both factors on firm performance. To our 
best knowledge, there is no research considering board independence as a mechanism to 
accelerate the benefits and decelerate the effect of debt on firm performance using emerging 
country context. In a review of literature on corporate governance research, Denis (2001) 
reveals that most of the literature focuses on examining implications of corporate governance 
instruments such as board structure and debt financing. In a review of the literature on corporate 
governance in emerging markets, Claessens and Yurtoglu (2013) also indicate a similar 
phenomenon. For example, empirical literature on corporate governance using data from Asian 
emerging countries (i.e Iturriaga and Crisóstomo, 2010; Sami et al., 2011; Salim and Yadav, 
2012; Khan, 2012; Hull and Dawar, 2014) only examines the direct effect of either board 
independence or debt financing on firm performance.  
In the context of Vietnam, there are a few studies about debt financing but they only focus on 
examining either determinants of debt financing (Nguyen and Ramachandran, 2006; Biger et 
al., 2007; Vo, 2017) or the effect of debt financing on firm performance (Vo and Ellis, 2017; 
Cuong, 2014). Regarding the role of board independence, there exist two studies about the 
direct effect of board independence on the performance of Vietnamese firms ( Vo and Nguyen, 
2014; Nguyen et al., 2017). In a study of corporate governance and firm's performance in 
Vietnam, Duc and Thuy (2013) included debt financing and board independence among other 
corporate governance factors in their examination of the effect of corporate governance and 
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performance of firms. However, none of these studies examines the moderating effect of board 
independence on the impact of debt financing on firm performance using data from Vietnam. 
 
2.4. The moderating effect of board independence 
In this study, we propose that debt financing generates both cost and benefit as suggested by the 
prior literature but the net effect of debt financing on firm's profitability is subject to a firm's 
characteristics and the country where the firm operates. Drawing on the institutional-based view 
of emerging markets (Hoskisson et al., 2000), we argue that because emerging market economy 
is in the early stage of development, the weakness of legal regulations and their enforcement in 
emerging market countries (Young et al., 2008) creates more chances for managers in emerging 
economies to manipulate business activities for their interests.   
The use of IDs is particularly useful when emerging market firms use debt financing. It is 
because IDs have the primary responsibility of overseeing the firm's financial reporting process 
(Anderson et al., 2004). Beasley (1996) find that the proportion of IDs on the board is inversely 
related to the likelihood of financial statement fraud. Without oversight of independent 
directors, the managers of emerging market firms may foresee an easy chance to manipulate 
financial statement and hence incline to borrow and invest in projects beneficial to their self-
interest rather than to firms (Kochhar, 1996; Le and O'Brien, 2010).  
With a high presence of IDs, the managers of emerging market firms would be subject to high 
scrutiny and therefore be more cautious and rational in making investment decisions from the 
borrowed money. The independently monitoring role of IDs ensures the transparency and 
effectiveness of debt usage (Peng, 2004; Mura, 2007).  
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The expertise and external relationships which IDs hold may also help managers to improve the 
outcomes of the investments made from borrowed money. Bringing in more outside directors 
may facilitate firms' borrowing (Mizruchi and Stearns, 1994) and access to broader sources of 
finance in the markets (Peng, 2004). IDs' external relations can help the firm obtain favourable 
loan terms, such as lower interest rates, larger loans and longer maturities of loan contracts to 
invest in profitable projects. More capital with a lower cost of financing for investment is likely 
to generate higher profitability (Le and O'Brien, 2010). Therefore, the more IDs on board are 
the more likelihood of obtaining low- cost debt financing and the more rational decisions 
relating to debt usage. These benefits which IDs bring about are likely to reduce the cost of debt 
and enhance the effectiveness of debt using, leading to higher profitability. Therefore, we 
propose that:  
Hypothesis 2: Board independence positively moderates the effect of debt financing on the 
profitability of public firms in emerging economies 
Our conceptual framework is illustrated in Figure 1. 
(Insert Figure 1 here) 
3. Research methodology 
3.1. Research context 
Since the introduction of the economic reform in 1986, Vietnam has gradually been 
transforming its economy from central planning toward free-market mechanism, promoting 
financial liberalization and facilitating constant institutional reforms. These economic reforms 
result in developments in equity and bond market in Vietnam. Since the establishment of 
Vietnam's first stock exchange in 2000, strong development is witnessed in Vietnam stock 
markets including a significant increase in both numbers of listed firms and total trading volume 
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(Vo, 2017). The development of the stock market provides firms with more options to finance 
their investments. By 2017, there are 700 Vietnamese enterprises listed in Vietnam's stock 
market. The financial and corporate governance decisions of these firms are assumed to follow 
the global practice but still being at the infant stage. 
Despite its pace of development, Vietnam's capital market is still at an early stage of 
development (Jain et al., 2017). Similar to most emerging markets, the problems of information 
asymmetries, higher volatility and higher transaction costs are evidenced in the stock market 
(Vo, 2017). Jain et al. (2017) indicate that Vietnam's capital market has a similar outlook to 
other Asian countries which investment opportunities, funding at scale, and pricing are less 
available or transparent. These problems hinder firms to finance through the stock market and 
as a result, most domestic firms are still relying on bank credit as a major or even the sole 
source of external funding (Vo, 2017). Therefore, Vietnam provides an ideal context for the 
study of the role of corporate governance in the improvement of the effectiveness of debt 
financing in emerging economy firms.  
3.2. The data 
We extracted data from the audited financial statements from 2013 to 2017 of all firms listed on 
Vietnam's stock market (Ho Chi Minh Stock Exchange and Ha Noi Stock Exchange). By 2017, 
among 700 enterprises listed on the stock exchange, we excluded firms in the financial sector 
(e.g. banks, real estate, securities and insurance firms). The reason for this is that financial firms 
have distinctive corporate structures and revenue models, indicated by an extraordinary 
performance indicator (Le and O'Brien, 2010). After excluding the financial firms in the 
financial sector and firms with missing information, the final sample consists of 300 companies, 
yielding 900 observations. The industries of the sample firms are outlined in Table A in the 
Appendix.  
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3.3.Empirical Model 
To test our hypothesis, we developed an empirical model in which firm accounting profitability 
is a dependent variable; debt financing, board independence and the interaction variable which 
is the product of debt financing and board independence are independent variables.  
 Following econometric literature (Baron and Kenny, 1986; Aiken and West, 1991) 
which suggests the usage of the product of the predictor and the moderator as the interaction 
variable to test the moderating effect, we employed the interaction variable as the product of 
Board Independence and Debt financing. We used the mean-centred approach suggested by 
Aiken and West (1991) to calculate the interaction variable to eliminate the possibility of 
multicollinearity. The interaction variable is calculated as below.  
 Interaction = (Debt - mean score of Debt) * (IDs - mean score of IDs) 
 We include several variables popularly used as control variables in corporate 
governance literature in our empirical model.  
 Board size. A small board is manageable and plays a controlling function, while a large 
board is non-manageable and so not able to act effectively (Rashid et al., 2010). We, therefore, 
control board size in this study.  
 CEO duality. When the CEO is also a board chair which is referred to in the literature 
as CEO duality, this may enable clear and powerful leadership, but it may also promote CEO 
entrenchment (Peng, 2004). Given the potential effect of CEO duality on firm performance, it is 
included as a control variable in this study.  
 Firm size. Firm size is a conventional predictor of a firm's performance because large 
firms can have a greater variety of capabilities which may positively influence performance 
(Williamson, 1967). Thus, firm size is included as a control variable in this study.   
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 Ownership structure. Firm's ownership structure has a significant impact on the board's 
role in monitoring management, which in turn can influence firm performance (Dharwadkar et 
al., 2000). In emerging economies, many public firms used to be state-owned enterprises, and 
after privatisation, a state may keep some stakes of the firms. State ownership may enhance 
some investment opportunities for the firm, but it may also create agency problems (Le and 
O'Brien, 2010). Thus, we control state ownership in this study. 
 A firm's industry.  Industry is an essential part of the business environment which frames 
organisational competition strategies and practices and hence performance (Porter, 1980). Thus, 
we controlled for the industry to capture the industry effect.  
 Based on the assumption that profitability of the current year is the outcomes of 
operation in the previous year (Bear et al., 2010; Jo and Harjoto, 2012), we developed the 
baseline model with the one-year lag of the predictors and control variables.    
 Equation 1 presents our baseline model. 
Yi;t = α  + β1 DEi;t−1 +β2 IDi;t−1  +β3IDi;t−1 ∗ DEi;t−1  + β4SOi;t−1 + β5 DUALi;t−1 +
 β6BOARDSIZE + β7 FIRMSIZEi;t−1 + β8 INDUSTRYi;t−1  +  εi:t (1) 
where for the ith firm at time t.  
𝑌𝑖;𝑡  is the profitability of the ith firm at time t. Firm's profitability is measured by two ratios: the 
ratio of Return-on-Assets (ROA) and the ratio of Return-on-Equity (ROE) as conventionally did 
in the extant corporate governance and corporate finance literature (e.g. Le and O’Brien, 2010). 
Follow Le and O’Brien (2010), we measured the return as the earnings before interest and tax. 
The information of a firm's earnings, assets and equity are provided in a firm's financial annual 
report.  
𝐼𝐷𝑖;𝑡−1  is the percentage of independent directors on board of the ith firm at time t-1 
𝐷𝐸𝑖;𝑡−1 is Debt-to-Equity ratio of the ith firm at time t-1 
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𝑆𝑂𝑖;𝑡−1 is the percentage of shares owned by the state of the ith firm at time t-1 
𝐷𝑈𝐴𝐿𝐼𝑇𝑌𝑖;𝑡−1 is to indicate the situation of CEO duality of the ith firm at time t-1. It is a 
dummy variable (equal to one (1) if the CEO and Chairperson posts are held by the same 
person, otherwise it is zero (0)); 
𝐹𝐼𝑅𝑀𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖;𝑡 − 1 is the firm’s size of the ith firm at time t-1, measured in terms of total asset 
value, and then normalized by a logarithm (lg.size); 
𝐵𝑂𝐴𝑅𝐷𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖;𝑡 − 1 is the board size of the ith firm at time t-1, measured in terms number of 
people on board, and then normalised by a logarithm; 
𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑇𝑅𝑌𝑖;𝑡−1 is to indicate the industry the ith firm at time t-1. Following Le and O’Brien 
(2010), we measured it by median firm performance for each industry in each year.  
and α is the intercept, β is the regression coefficient, and 𝜀 is the error term. 
3.3. Estimation Strategy 
Treatment for reverse causality  
There is a potential for the reverse causality between profitability and debt financing. Myers 
(1977; 1984) suggest that firms prefer raising capital, first from retained earnings, second from 
debt, and third from issuing new equity. This behaviour may be due to the costs of issuing new 
equity, or transaction costs or the costs that arise because of asymmetric information. In either 
case, the past profitability of a firm, and hence the number of earnings available to be retained, 
could be a determinant of its current debt financing (Titman and Wessels, 1988).  
We addressed the potential reverse causality between profitability and debt financing by 
explicitly employing lag model as presented in Equation (1). Intuitively, this model helps to rule 
out the reverse causality because future events (i.e ROA, ROE) cannot cause the current 
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conditions (i.e debt financing). The profitability of the current year cannot be a determinant of 
the debt financing of the year before. Empirically, we conducted an additional test to rule out 
the reverse causality explicitly. We tested a model with a different lag structure in which debt 
financing is a dependent variable and lag one year of its predictor variables which are 
profitability and the other control variables used in Equation (1). The unreported model shows 
that current profitability is not a significant predictor of the previous year debt financing. 
Diagnostic tests  
We conducted several diagnostic tests for our dataset. First, we checked the multicollinearity 
problem by examining correlation coefficients among predictors and their Variance Inflation 
Factor (VIF). As presented in Table 1, all of the VIFs are smaller than 10, suggesting that 
multicollinearity is not a problem with our dataset (Mansfield and Helms, 1982). 
(Insert Table 1 here) 
Second, we checked the heteroscedasticity problem. Breusch-Pagan test result with p=0.000 
shows that the heteroscedasticity problem exists in our estimation model.  
Third, we examined the potential endogeneity of IDs, DE and IDs*DE. We conducted the 
Durbin-Wu–Hausman tests (see Hausman (1978) for a detailed explanation of the test). Test 
statistics are insignificant for IDs but significant for DE and IDs*DE.  
To address the endogeneity problem of the independent variable (DE, IDs*DE), following Le& 
O'brien (2010), we used the standard deviation of the firm's stock return (SESR) of the previous 
year as an instrumental variable (IV) for DE. We also employed SESR as an IV for DE*IDs. 
Intuitively, SESR meets two requirements of a good instrumental variable. It is believed to have 
a strong effect on predicting variables (DE, DE*IDs) but weak on the dependent variable (ROA, 
ROE).  
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Empirically, to check if SESR is a good IV, we conducted the Durbin (score) chi-sq test and 
Wu-Hausman F test of the endogeneity of DE and DE*IDs when SESR is in use as an IV 
respectively for DE and DE*IDs. The large P-values obtained from these tests show that the 
hypothesis of exogenous regressor cannot be rejected. Moreover, the results of the Sargan 
(score) chi2 tests and Basmann chi2 tests (p < 0.05) demonstrate that our models have no 
overidentifying restrictions. Thus, the endogeneity issue of DE and DE*IDs was addressed.  
Estimation Method and Robustness Check  
Our research sample contains longitudinal/panel data. The diagnostic tests show that the data 
reveals heteroscedasticity and endogeneity problem. Wooldridge (2010) indicates that either the 
Fixed effect/Random effect with an instrument variable or GMM estimation method can help to 
overcome such problems. In this study, we use fixed effects/random effects estimation model 
with instrument variable (using xtivreg 2 command in Stata 14) to estimate an FE-IV model. 
We then conducted the Hausman test to select our preferred baseline model and used the results 
of the less preferred model for robustness check. This is to follow Bell & Jones (2015) 
suggestion for not ruling out the results of the other model just because of Hausman test results. 
We also run one-step system - GMM (due to small T and large N; using xtabond command in 
Stata 14 to estimate GMM model) for robustness check.  
 
4. Results 
The descriptive statistics of the dataset and correlation matrix among variables are summarised 
in Table 2. The average total assets (firm size) is VND 1.23 trillion, equivalent to USD 54.26 
million (22,700VND= 1USD). On average, the State has 38 percent stake in privatized firms. 
Twenty-eight percent of firms have a chairman who is also a CEO. The average Debt-to-Equity 
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ratio is 1.576. The average board size is 5.4 people. The average proportion of IDs is 60.5 
percent. The average Return-on-Asset is 5.04 percent. The average Return-on-Equity is 7.9 
percent. 
(Insert Table 2 here) 
The testing results obtained from FE-IV and RE-IV are presented in Table 3 for both ROA and 
ROE. Based on the Hausman test with Prob < 0.05, the FE model was employed as the baseline 
model. The results in Table 3 reveal that debt financing has a statistically significant and 
negative effect on both ROA (β = -0.163, p= 0.049) and ROE (β = -0.201, p= 0.000).  
The results presented in the FE models in Table 3 also indicate that the significantly positive 
effect of IDs on profitability (β = 0.386, p= 0.004 for ROA and β = 0.557, p= 0.007 for ROE).  
(Insert Table 3 here) 
Finally, the results reported in Table 3 (FE models) show that the interaction variable has a 
significant and positive effect on both ROA (β =0.254, p= 0.001) and ROE (β =0.480, p= 
0.000).  
As shown in Table 3, the results obtained from FE models are consistent to results reported in 
RE models, initially indicating that our results are robust. For further robustness check, as 
mentioned earlier, we conducted the GMM estimation method. The testing results obtained 
from one-step system GMM reported in Table 4 show the consistency with the FE/RE- IV 
results, confirming the robustness of our results.  
(Insert Table 4 here) 
The result that the interaction variable has a significant and positive effect on profitability 
signals the existence of the moderating effect of board independence on the impact of debt 
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financing on profitability. This result provides necessary but not sufficient condition for the 
moderating effect. To conclude on the positive moderating effect of IDs, following Aiken and 
West (1991), we examine if the effects of DE on ROA/ROE in high IDs firms are higher than 
those with low IDs. Aiken and West (1991) suggest choosing the mean of predictors as the 
medium level and one standard deviation above and below the mean as high level and low 
level, respectively. Adopting this approach, we have examined the variance of ROA/ROE 
according to three levels of debt financing and two levels of the IDs. The results are presented 
in Table 5, Figure 2 and 3.  
(Insert Table 5 here) 
As shown in Figure 1, the slope of the brown line (presenting the effect of DE on ROA in high 
ID firms) is steeper than that of the blue line (presenting the effect of DE on ROA in low ID 
firms). This shows the effect of DE on ROA in high IDs firms is higher than those with low 
IDs. A similar outcome can be interpreted in Figure 2. The effect of DE on ROE in high IDs 
firms is higher than those with low IDs. Therefore, it can be confirmed that IDs strengthen the 
effect of DE on profitability. In other words, our hypothesis H1 is accepted.  
(Insert Figure 2 here) 
(Insert Figure 3 here) 
We also examined the explanatory power of the regression models and the incremental power 
of each significant repressor by investigating the values of R-squared and partial R-squared of 
the regression models using equation (1). The regression model for ROA and ROE has R-
squared of 72.3% and 70.9% respectively. This indicates that 72.3% of ROA and 70.9% of 
ROE and can be explained by variations of independent variables in our equation (1). 
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Partial R-squared of Debt for ROA and ROE are 25.7% and 33.1% respectively. This indicates 
that 25.7% of ROA and 33.1% of ROE can be partially explained by variations of Debt. Partial 
R-squared of IDs for ROA and ROE are 0.21% and 0.23% respectively. This means that only 
0.21% of ROA and 0.23% ROE can be partially explained by variations of IDs. 
5. Discussions 
Our results show that debt financing tends to harm the profitability of listed firms in Vietnam. 
This result contrasts with studies using data from developed markets such as Berger and Patti 
(2006) and Margaritis & Psillaki (2010). Perhaps, the inefficient capital market in Vietnam is 
likely to erode the potential benefits of debt, thereby causing debt to be destructive to firm 
performance. In other words, this result lends the support to the theoretical work by 
Dharwadkar et al. (2000) which argues that debt has impaired the performance of firms in an 
emerging economy. 
This result is in line with that of Le and O'Brien (2010). Le and O'Brien (2010) examine the 
effect of debt financing on the performance of Chinese listed firms. They also consider one of 
the corporate governance factors (firm ownership) as the contingency factor that moderates the 
debt financing -performance relation. Our finding is inconsistent with Davydov (2016) which 
uses the data from four emerging countries including Brazil, China, Russia and India but finds a 
positive impact. Davydov (2016) does not consider corporate governance factors (e.g board 
independence in his evaluation of the effect of debt financing on the performance) and that 
could explain for why his result is inconsistent with ours as well as Le and O'Brien (2010).  
More importantly, our finding shows that a high level of board independence significantly 
reduces the negative effect of debt financing. To our knowledge, there is no research 
considering the moderating effect of board independence on the financial leverage-performance 
relation. Also, this finding indicates the necessity to consider board independence when 
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studying the financial leverage- performance relation. This can be explained by the practice that 
debt financing decision is one of the critical corporate decisions and hence likely to be put 
under the strict supervision of independent directors. Therefore, the omission of the role of 
board independence in such evaluation is likely to produce biased results. More significantly, 
this finding suggests that that debt has both costs and benefits which may vary per corporate 
governance properties (i.e. board independence).  
Last but not least, our result also provides further empirical evidence for the effectiveness of 
board independence in corporate governance in emerging markets. The extant literature on 
corporate governance in emerging markets offers inconsistent findings on the direct effect of 
IDs on firm financial performance. For example, Peng (2004) found the positive impact of 
board independence from the sample of Chinese firms. Darko et al. (2016) discovered the 
negative effects in the context of Ghana. Meanwhile, Tian and Lau (2001) reported that board 
composition has no significant effect on the performance of Chinese firms. This is possible 
because those studies only focused on the direct effect and did not consider the moderating 
effect of board independence.  
Our results suggest that management literature should consider corporate governance properties 
as mechanisms which can either accelerate or decelerate the effects of other managerial 
instruments on firm performance. To date, management literature has much focused on 
examining the direct effects of corporate governance properties on firm performance and this 
may be one of the reasons for the inconsistent findings of the effect of corporate governance 
properties such as board independence. 
6.Conclusion 
6.1. Summary of the research 
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This study examines the moderating effect of board independence on debt financing- 
profitability relation using data from firms in Vietnam. We developed the empirical model in 
which firm's accounting profitability is a dependent variable while debt financing, board 
independence, the interaction variable made of debt financing and board independence, and 
various control variables are independent variables. We manually collected the data from the 
audited financial reports of 300 listed firms in Vietnam in the period 2013-2017. We used three 
estimation methods that include FE/RE-IV and GMM to evaluate and validate the effect. We 
found a significantly adverse effect of debt financing. More importantly, we reported that board 
independence significantly weakens the adverse impact of debt on accounting profitability. Our 
results are robust as they are consistent across three different estimation methods.  
6.2. Theoretical Implications 
Our paper makes three contributions to literature. First, our paper is the first investigating the 
moderating effect of board independence on debt financing- performance relation. While 
considerable work in management has examined the governance implications of debt financing 
and the governance implications of board composition; none has considered corporate 
governance properties (i.e board independence) as mechanisms to accelerate the benefits and 
decelerate the adverse effect of debt on firm performance.  Second, our study responds to 
O'Brien (2003) and Jermias (2008) calls for future research incorporating situational and 
contingency factors in a study of financial leverage- performance relation. Despite many studies 
on the effect of debt financing on firm performance, the results are inconclusive. Our work 
shows that corporate governance (i.e, board independence) is one of the key contingent factors 
that influence on the financial leverage- performance relation. As such, a study of the effect of 
financial leverage on firm performance needs to consider the effect under different scenarios of 
corporate governance. Finally, our paper adds to corporate finance and corporate governance 
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literature the evidence of the effectiveness of debt financing and board independence in 
Vietnam, the context of an emerging market that is under-researched.  
6.3. Implications for Practice  
We recommend public firms in emerging economies to reduce the use of debt financing due to 
its adverse effect on firm performance. In case, the use of debt financing is unavoidable; the 
firms should employ more independent directors because the monitoring and supervising role of 
IDs helps to prevent the bad investment decisions possibly made by self-interest seeking 
managers. 
6.4. Limitations and Suggestion for Future Research 
Our study has some limitations. First, we did not disintegrate debt in the long term or short term 
debt while different types of debt may affect firm performance in different ways. Second, this 
study conducted tests in the context of one emerging economy. It will be more significant if a 
future study conducts empirical tests on several emerging economies. We suggest future 
research to consider the moderating role of other corporate governance factors than board 
independence when examining financial leverage- performance relation. We also recommend 
future research to consider the mediating impacts of corporate governance factors instead of 
relying on the assumption about their direct impact on firm performance. For example, future 
research can consider board size, CEO duality, firm size, and firm ownership as moderating 
factors of the relationship between a firm's managerial instruments and performance.  
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Appendix  
Table A: Industry-based classification of the sample 
Industry  Description  
Observations 
(2013-2017) 
Industry 1 Agriculture, forestry and fishing 20 
Industry 2 Mining and quarrying 90 
Industry 3 Manufacturing 435 
Industry 4 Electricity, Gas, Steam and Air Conditioning supply 115 
Industry 5 Water supply 20 
Industry 6 Construction 430 
Industry 7 Wholesale and retail trade 160 
Industry 8 Transportation and storage 105 
Industry 9 Accommodation and food service activities 35 
Industry 10 Information and communication 40 
Industry 11 Professional, Scientific and technical activities 15 
Industry 12 Administrative and supportive service 15 
Industry 13 Arts, entertainment and recreation 20 
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Table 1. Correlation matrix 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2. Descriptive Statitic 
Variable Obs Mean S. Dev. Min Max 
ROA 1500 0.050 0.094 -0.689 1.719 
ROE 1500 0.079 2.270 -51.125 65.053 
DE 1500 1.576 1.463 0.000 0.820 
ID 1500 0.605 0.183 0.000 0.900 
SO 1500 0.381 0.217 0.000 0.890 
BOARDSIZE 1500 5.430 1.160 0.000 12.000 
FIRMSIZE 1500 1.23 0.292 0.045 301.492 
Note: Firm size is measured by total asset in trillion VND 
 
 
ROA ROE DE ID DE*ID SO DUAL BOARDSIZE FIRMSIZE VIF 
ROA 1 
         ROE 0.1504 1 
        DE  -0.0103 -0.7096 1 
      
4.54 
ID 0.0106 0.0561 0.0163 1 
     
1.11 
DE*ID 0.0654 0.4913 -0.6817 0.0375 1 
    
4.55 
SO -0.0332 0.0057 -0.0063 -0.0097 0.0129 1 
   
1.11 
DUAL -0.0293 -0.0045 0.0108 -0.2492 -0.0286 -0.1711 1 
  
1.11 
BOARDSIEZE -0.0001 -0.0095 -0.0128 0.1077 0.0152 -0.2314 -0.0258 1 
 
1.16 
FIRMSIZE 0.0654 0.0104 0.0061 0.1311 -0.0048 0.0362 0.0149 0.2621 1 1.10 
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Table 3: Fixed/Random effect-IV results for ROA and ROE 
 
ROA  ROE 
FE  
 
RE  FE  RE 
Coeff. p value 
 
Coeff. p value  Coeff. p value  Coeff. p value 
Lag DE     -0.163 0.049 
 
-0.124 0.046  -0.201 0.000  -0.200 0.001 
Lag ID 0.386 0.004 
 
0.186 0.023  0.557 0.007  0.638 0.000 
Lag DE*ID 0.254 0.001 
 
0.314 0.041  0.480 0.000  0.479 0.003 
Lag SO 0.090 0.293 
 
0.025 0.173  0.031 0.001  0.019 0.062 
Lag DUAL 0.066 0.052 
 
0.013 0.072  0.020 0.078  0.041 0.043 
Lag BOARDSIZE 0.039 0.045 
 
0.061 0.849  0.048 0.673  0.037 0.857 
Lag FIRMSIZE 0.029 0.607 
 
0.054 0.033  0.115 0.027  0.046 0.002 
Lag Industry 1 0.619 0.278 
 
0.064 0.139  0.399 0.495  0.085 0.834 
Lag Industry 2 0.034 0.051 
 
0.040 0.091  0.047 0.832  0.145 0.727 
Lag Industry 3 0.073 0.091 
 
0.044 0.318  0.969 0.263  0.086 0.832 
Lag Industry 4 0.052 0.132 
 
0.046 0.017  0.231 0.541  0.116 0.778 
Lag Industry 5 0.089 0.438 
 
0.050 0.355  0.099 0.811  0.135 0.762 
Lag Industry 6 -0.035 0.762 
 
0.080 0.857  -0.155 0.883  0.147 0.718 
Lag Industry 7 0.059 0.513 
 
0.031 0.491  1.463 0.097  0.227 0.581 
Lag Industry 8 0.288 0.703 
 
0.063 0.160  -0.382 0.619  0.052 0.901 
Lag Industry 9 0.049 0.328 
 
0.066 0.186  0.059 0.821  0.044 0.918 
Lag Industry 10 0.592 0.874 
 
0.111 0.822  0.062 0.817  0.029 0.946 
Lag Industry 11 0.194 0.821 
 
0.357 0.503  -0.065 0.941  0.092 0.842 
Lag Industry 12 0.651 0.439 
 
0.389 0.498  0.431 0.549  0.339 0.457 
Lag Industry 13 0.034 0.792 
 
0.057 0.916  0.079 0.838  0.074 0.869 
Constant -0.101 0.043   -0.197 0.005  -3.541 0.016  -1.490 0.009 
N 900   900   900   900  
R-squared 0.690   0.659   0.881   0.879  
Hausman Test Prob > Chi2 = 0.0324  Prob > Chi = 0.0119 
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Table 4: One step- system GMM results 
 
ROA  ROE 
Coeff. p value  Coeff. p value 
Lag Profitability 0.091 0.107  0.198 0.389 
Lag DE -0.005 0.000  -0.232 0.000 
Lag ID 0.066 0.018  1.131 0.023 
Lag DE*ID 0.089 0.003  1.113 0.041 
Lag SO -0.073 0.062  0.148 0.744 
Lag DUAL -0.007 0.713  -0.270 0.319 
Lag BOARDSIZE -0.015 0.022  -0.103 0.144 
Lag FIRMSIZE 0.000 0.403  0.000 0.529 
Lag Industry1 1.053 0.034  4.223 0.466 
Lag Industry2 -0.052 0.874  -4.008 0.239 
Lag Industry3 0.706 0.307  -2.260 0.596 
Lag Industry4 -0.450 0.338  1.554 0.737 
Lag Industry5 0.454 0.422  2.097 0.810 
Lag Industry6 -0.078 0.865  -3.309 0.528 
Lag Industry7 -0.196 0.808  -0.713 0.924 
Lag Industry8 0.121 0.592  0.662 0.728 
Lag Industry9 0.025 0.888  2.095 0.361 
Lag Industry10 -0.080 0.845  1.452 0.778 
Lag Industry11 0.336 0.307  1.793 0.434 
Lag Industry12 -0.072 0.480  -0.390 0.590 
Lag Industry13 -0.562 0.125  -0.365 0.904 
Constant 0.031 0.599  0.963 0.164 
N 900   900  
AR(1) p=0.151 
 
 p=0.053  
AR(2) p=0.852 
 
 p=0.082  
Sargen Test p=0.068    p=0.070   
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Table 5: The moderating effect of IDs on debt financing- profitability relation 
 
ROA Financial leverage 
  
Low Medium High 
IDs 
 
The lowest % of IDs  0.5188 0.5158 0.5129 
The highest % of IDs  0.3910 0.4949 0.5988 
ROE Financial Leverage 
  
Low Medium High 
IDs 
 The lowest % of IDs 2.3527 2.2707 2.1888 
 The highest % of IDs 2.0503 2.6998 3.3494 
 
Figure 1: Conceptual Framework 
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Figure 2: The effects of DE on ROA in case of low and high IDs 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
Figure 3: The effects of DE on ROE in case of low and high IDs 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
